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PUBLIC

INSUPANC~,

PPIVA!E INSURANCE, AND ThE DEMAND FOB HOSPITAL CABE:

IfPLICATIGNS fO& MiDICAEE AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS

Martin. Zelder
February 21, 1983
Oberlin College

In 1971, Elliot Richardson, then Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, lamented the state of the American
health care system:
Health care in the United States is a
current example of a vast social issue encrusted
with a layer of invention and illusion.
We
all know there is something wrong with the
current health care system, and it is commonly
held that too few doctors, greedy insurance
companies, and an apathetic government are
a t fa ult..
Bu t are these the real problems? (22, p. ?31) •
Twelve years hence Richardsonts comments
pertinent.

rem~in

Hospital care expenditures have continued to

rise dramatically, composing 5 percent of Gross National
Product in 1982.

Moreover, this rise in expenditure has

occurred during a period of unprecedented inflation in the
economy in general and in the
particular.

health care sector in

.

Indeed, while the consumer price index rose 36

percent from 1973-1977, the hospital component of the

cpr

rose 64 percent.
Many economists have suggested that the culprit
responsible for the rampant inflation and spiraling
expendi tures in the health care sector is medical insurance,
which lowers the price which consumers pay, thus encouraging
them to consume more.

Furthermore, by largely divorb ing

consumption decisions from price considerations, insurance
has also been accused of contributing to the inflation of

2

health care costs.

To determine the e ffect of insurance on

the demand fer hospital care, a model of the demand for
hospital care for the period 1973-1977 is estimated in this
paper.

By means of this estimation process , the

responsiveness of consumers to the actual price they pay for
hospital care can be determined.

Although economists hav e

previou s ly estimated the effect of insurance on th e demand
for hospital care, their analysiS has never accurately
accounted for all types o£ insurance, i.e., private hospital
insurance, Medicare hospital insurance, and Medicaid
hospital insurance.

Thu s , the model es timated in this paper

represents an attempt to include all types of insurance in
the estimatien process, so that the average price paid by
th e consumer, as calculated in this research, reflects the
influence and magnitude of public as well as private
insurance.

In aedition,

this research will provide an

esimate of the relative effects of public and private
hospi tal ins tiranee on the dema nd for hospital care.
The findings of this paper can briefly be summarized.
Demand, as measured by hospital admissisons rate, is
inelastic.
elastic.

\

Demand, as measured by mean length of stay, i s \
A given amount of public hospital insurance has a

small, but significantly larger effect on demand, by either
measure, than an equal amount of private hospital insurance.

(!)r hese estimates can then be applied to se veral tOPics.l

one

such topic is the effect of the Reagan Administration's plan

v1tr

~'"

'1
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to alter the Medicare benefit payment syste m.

A second

application measures the welfare loss (Martin Feldstein ' s
phrase)

of "excess" hospi ta 1 insurance co verage, and the

gains which would occur if patients were forced to pay a
larger share of total costs.

Finally, suqqestions are made

regarding st£uctural changes in

private insurance

contracts, and ways in which these proposed chanqes can
alter incentives, and thus alleviate tile health C3.re crisis
which plagues America.
Chapter 2 is a brief history of private hospital
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid.
pertinen~

used.

literature.

Chapter 4

Chapter 3 is a review of

de~cribes

Chapter 5 enumerates the.results.

interpretation of the results.

Chapter 6 offers

Chapter 7 analyzes the

implication s of the results obtained.
the paper.

the methodoloqy

Chapter 8 concludes
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th e private hospital insurance market arose from the
financial insta.bility of the Depression.

The possibilty of

catastrophic , expensive hospitalization provided an
incentive for individuals to spread the risk of this
occurrence through insurance.

Simulta.eously, the

possibility that individuals would be unable to pay for
hospital ser vic es led hospitals to seek financial protection
through insurance a s well.
Cross.

From these two forces came Blue

until very recently, the link between hospitals and

Blue Cro ss has been guite strong, as the activities of Blue
Cross were controlled by the American Hospital Association
(27).

In the 1940's commercial insurers (as distinguished

from non-profit Blue

Cros~

began to compete agqresively

with Blue Cross by offering a slightly di f ferentiated
product.

Betore the entrance cf commercial insuL"ers,. Blu e

Cross had used commu nity- ra ting to determine its premiums.
That is, no distinction between higher- and lOWer-ri s k
people was reflected in premiums; all individuals and groups
paid essentially the same amount.

Commercial insurers, on

the ot her hand, e mployed experience-rating in the
determination of premiums.

This meant that the risk

connected with a certain group was reflected in the premium
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paid by members of that qroup, based on the group' s
ch.aracteristics

(age,sex,race,income).

Bec a us e

0

f

this

. ~~

policy commercial insur e rs were able to lure low-risk

>

indi viduals awa y from Blue Cross by offer inq a lower premium
for

hos~ital

insurance.

Blue cross responded by adoptinq

experience-rating, and vigorous competition ensued.

~ 3~ ue

Today,

Cross still dominate s th.e private insurance market,

y.r 'i:01'sessin g maritet shares of 40 to 80 percen t from state to

"\.
-o ~1" state, with a mean market s hare of 43 percent.

'7:-~

-

/c;

The development of the private insurance market based
upon experience-rating meant that neither Blue Cross nor
commercial insurers could economically cover high-risk
individuals.
major groups:

Foremost among high-cisk individuals were two
the elderly and the indigent.

To provide

medical coverage for these two segments of society, Medicare
and Medicaid, respectively, were instituted in 1966.

Both.

Medicare and Medicaid were products of President Johnson's
Great Society program, and were approv e d under the auspices
of the Social Security Amendments as Title XVIII and XIX,
res pecti vel y.

Medicare is composed of two parts:

hospital

insurance (Part A) and supplementary medical insurance (Part
B) •

Co

0

premiums

ar~ Picall!> charged

for Medicare hospi tal

benefits; instead, benefits are financed by means of the
Social Security payroll tax.

(Only the elderly who are not

eligible for Social Security benefits must pay premiums.)
Medicare recipients must, however, make a copayment equal to

1.

.
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the average

~rice

o~

hospi ta l day for the first sixt y

-

days ot hospitalization, and pay one-fourth of the copayment
for each day fro m sixty-one through ninety.

Finally, if all

ninety days of coverage are exhausted, the Medicare
beneficiary must pay one-half of the copayment for each d a y
for additional care (each jedicare recipient has a lifetime
reserve of sixty such days.) In contrast to

~edicare,which

is completely administered by the federal government,
Medicaid is fu .nded both by the federal government and local
governments.

Each stat e determines the size of its direct

Medicaid payments, and the federal government

suppli~s

matching funds based upon the state's own allocation.

All

states except Arizona participat e in Medicaid, and benefits
vary greatly fro:n state to state.
~edicaid

Approximately half of th'e

proqram is financed through federal general

revenues; th e other half comes from state and local funds.
Although some states exercise the option to charge premiums
to Medicaid beneficiaries who have a ce-rtain level of income
or higher, the vast majority of Medicaid revenues corne
directly from income taxes.

Finally, Medicaid in its

original formulation placed no limit on the number of days
of hospital care covered.

Although some states have

gradually added limitations, relaxation of these
restrictions is often allowed because of "medical necessity"
(23) •
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Two theoretical notions have

deve~o

ped to explain th e

e ffect which health insurance has upon the
medical care.

dem~nd

for

They are mcral hazard and welfare loss.

Moral hazard is defined by Paul Feldstein in this way:
"Since insurance lowers the price of medical care to
individuals, they will consume more care than if they had to
pay the entire price themselves" (10,p. 118).

l10ral hazard,

then is the movement down the demand curve in respon se to
the lover

price of medical care.

efJ~gti~

This lower

effective price occurs because, with insurance coverage,the
individual pays a fraction of the total price.

The

proportion which the individual remits is the coinsurance
rate.

Thus, if an insurance policy stipula tes that 80

percent of an individual's medicial expenses will be paid,
the corresponding coinsurance rate is 20 percent.
hazard is depicted below in Figure 1.
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~ ithout

insuranc e the individual initially chooses QG units

of medical care at price Po.

with the introduction of

(l-k)

percent insurance coverage, the individual move s down th e
demand curve to consume Q.

units of medical care,

where the

effective price is the coinsurance rate times ' the original
price, kPo •

The loss to the indi vidual when moral hazard

occurs is shewn by the shaded triangle
of ABC a s a measure of moral hazard
geometrically described.
original choice,
AQo •

ABC.

~oss

The derivation

can be

The market value of the consum e r' s

(00 ,Po)' is represen ted by the rectangle OPo
Q1

When the individua 1 increases nis con sum ption to

the market value of the additional consumption is QoIBQ,.
The rea s on that market value eguals

QoABQ"

and not OkPo

~ rue

as is t ypically the cas e in d e mand theory, is that the
0\«',\

pri ce of each unit is still Po, although

tt'..J.t

CQ. '

CJIr;)\

the ~rice" to

,

the

individual has been reduced.

Of the value of the additional
tc= \o.,,~~ ~K
care which is consumed, the ~~a ~~, is realized as .
~-u..a. r"~o-~,, ~C.Q,<:?o·'-~ ~ ot~ ~~ l~\....J.. ~ ~ ~':>~.t .
consumer 1 s s urplus
Thus, the remaining region, ABC, is
dead-weight loss.
Why, then, does moral hazard occur?

Pauly (17) and

Arrow (2) attribute the occurrence of this phenomenon to
informational inefficiency and the special nature of the
medical market and product(s).

For both Pauly and Arrow the

root of moral hazard is individual preventive behavior, or
lack thereof.

Although, as'Arrow maintins, "illness is to a

considerable extent an unpredictable phenomenon," individual

9

behavior suc h as inactivity , smokinq, and poor diet can
increase the prol:ability of medical expense

(2,p. 945).

One

informational inefficiency occurs p.r ecisely because insurers
cannot monitor the behavior of individuals.

Thus, in

specifying the conditions of an insurance contract, it is
impossible to distinguish between avoidable and unavoidable
cisks.

As a result, incentives to lim.it activities which

promote "avoidable" losses are difficult to incorporate in
insurance contracts.

The optimal insurance contract, then,

is one in which the insured bears a portion of the costs he
incurs to the insurer--a contract in which the "optimal
trade-off between conflicting goals of furtherinq risk
spreading and providing appropriate incentives" occurs
(17,p.46).

Another informational inefficiency which

prevent s accurate determination of expected losses by
insurers is noted by Pauly.

Because the possession of

insurance increases the consumption of medical care,

*'

-

insurers estimate their expected losses to be an increasing

function of the amount of insurance held by their clients.
Insurers are not aware, however, of the total insurance

holdings of their clients, as individuals may hold policies
with several firms simultaneously.

In fact, other insurers

have strong incentives to conceal their sales, and as a
result, premiums will be set inappropriately low to cover
the true expected loss of insured individuals.

At this

lower price insurance is overconsumed relative to Pauly· s

10

" second best optimum", where premiums
are directly related.

~rid

expected l oss es

(Pauly's true optimum is defined as

the case in which premiums vary with participation in
activities which increase the probability of

illness~ )

Other' informational ine££iciences which cause
insurance-holding to be excessive, and thu s losses from
moral hazard to occur, pertain to informational problem s
with the medical product.

Two special characteristics of

the medical market which are cited relate to the behavior of
physicians and the inadequate

incorporation , o~

information

regarding the medical product in insurance contracts.

Arro w

describes the physician as a figure of trust who i s bound by
the ethical restriction s of his profession.

These ethical

restrictions can te thought of in the context of the
phys.ician's agency relationship with the patient; that is ,
the physician is purportedly committed to act in his
patient ' s best interest s .

Accordingly, the physician i s

charged with the duty of saving and enhancing life while not
prescriting excessive treatment merely to increase his own
income .

If the physician fulfills these ethical

stipulations, his agency relationship with the patient i s
complete_ . Pauly and Redisch, however, guestion the
completeness of the agency relationship, a nd suggest that
the physician's frimary motive is to maximize income

(18).

with this possibility, and the prevalence of insurance, i t
seems plausillle that the Fhysician exacerbates the moral

1/

,
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hazard problem.

Zeckhauser (26)

examines another of the

inherent problems of the medical market which leads to moral
hazard--the lack of distinction in insurance plans among
various medical procedures.

Because of the multi-product

nature of the hosfital, and even intra-product differences
{severity of illness,complementary procedures), insurance
contracts do not distinguish between different classes of
conditions.

Zeckhauser shows that withotit distinctions in

claims reimbursement, excessive spending occurs for all
possible conditions.

To provide adequate.coverage

simul taneous ly with incen ti ves to limit expenses, Zeckha user
proposes differentia ted reimbursement based upon the type of
illness.

Although he admits that a plan with distinction

oetween every type of procedure is too costly to be
realistic, he suggests that distinctions be made amonq
~arious

classes of illness.

Zeckhauser's model shows that

the marginal coinsurance rate with class distinctions is
higher than the coinsurance rate without distinctions,
providing incentives for "appropriate" expenditure while
still spreading risk.
The loss from moral hazard, however, is only part of the
total effect on individual welfare which insurance-holding,
and its implications for price and quantity determination,
has.

Martin Feldstein (8) examines this total effect,

referred to as welfare loss, in his 1973 article.

Feldstein

maintains that moral hazard loss is an exaggerated measure
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ior several reasons.

First, he claims that becau se

insurance raises the gross price {i.e., price with no
insurance coverage), demand does not increase as much as it
would have,

had gross price re mained at its original level.

Second, Feldstein suggests that the higher price way denote
h igher quali ty, which causes demand to shift.

Third, if the

higher price does indicate higher quality, then total
welfare loss is further reduced.

Crucial to Feldstein' s

analysis is bis treatment of quality and the change in
quality~

Feldstein states that, "The increased gross price

(i. e. ,cost)

t:er patient day provides a service that is of

higher gua:l ity

~ .E~ rce-i

ved ..E.Y j:he hO§.B.i!s.l"

(8, pp. 267- 8) •

Feldstein continues his analysis by stating that if patients
perceiv~

the new, higher price to manifest an increase in

quality, demand will increase.

He makes no binding

assumpt-ion in his e mpirical anal ysis, however, about whether
this demand shift actually occurs, as h e calculate s welfare
loss with demand shift factors of 0, .?3, and .67.
Nevertheless, he describes these somewhat arbitrary
estimate s of demand shif t magnitude as "moderate and
rela ti vely conser vati ve"

(8 ,p. 269) •
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Welfare loss, a s described above, can be qr a phical1y
uepicted (Figure

pp,

fz,

p'

o
I nitially the consumer purcha ses

00

unit s at price PD.

The

introduction of insurance (coinsurance rate =k) increases the
gross price of care to

~

price to the consumer i s
new, higher gross price

, and thus the effective, or net,
k~

PI

.If the consumer perceives th e

to be a reflection of a quali"ty

increase, then the demand curve shifts up from D to De.

To

consume the original amcunt of hospital care, Qo' a price of
P~

must be paid.

Th e new equilibrium thlls becomes(Q, ,kP. ).

The amount of welfare loss is represented by the shaded
area, P, BECPJ,.' and the .following formula:

~~'~ ~-\
J~~~)
O~~

~.

14

The rectangle PI ACPl- corresponds to the first term,
in the welfare loss equation.

It represents tbe loss that

occurs due to the effect of insurance after the demand
shift.

That is, the price per unit of care for the oriqinal

quantity demanded is P1 after the demand shift, but after
demand shifts

~'!!.Q

insurance i s introduced the price is

P, .

Thus the rectangle constructed by the multiplication of

.~

and (P, -P2 ) represents one portion of the dead-weight loss.
The remaining loss area, trapezoid ABEC, can be derived in a
manner similar to that in which moral hazard loss was
derived.

In moving down the demand curve from QD to Q"

th e

total market value of the additional care consumed is the
Fe. E

o-S-:\l~ ~ ~ ~ \?~ "-I\...:J.-

rectangl e ABQ.Qo. The consumer' s s urplu s , ~Q , ~
~ ~ ~, F'EGt,Ct'o, ~
" s ubtracted from this, leaving trapezoid ABBe as dead-weight
loss.
welfa~e

This quantity, added

t~ P,

ACP%, constitutes the total

loss resultant from the introduction of insurance.

Feldstein applies this formulation of welfare loss to
demand estimation and thus produces estimates of existing
welfare losses.

The demand-far-insurance equation is

estimated, with both quantity of insurance and proportion of
population enrolled as dependent variables.

Independent

variables are gross price of hospital care, price of health
insurance (ratio. of pJ:emiums to benefits), proportion of
employees in manUfacturing or government (i.e., those lik e ly
to have group coverage), per capita income, an income
variable weighted by the distribution of insurance, the

\
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dependent variable lagged, and a composite variable which
includes price and income elasticities of demand for
hospital care.

('Ihese price and income elasticities are the

results of a previous study (6), which will be discussed in
detail telow.) Feldstein's most important result from this
estimation is the value of the elasticity of demand for
insura.nce with respect to the price o.f hospital ca.re.

This

elasticity is significantly positive both when quantity of
insurance is the dependent variable and when proportion
enrolled is the dependent variable.
M

Feldstein then PP&ee-eds.

sho wS theoretically tna t an increase in insurance

increases the price of hospital care by shifting the demand
curve outward.

Thus, an increase in the price of hospital

care increases the quantity of insurance demanded; an
increase in . the quantity of insurance demanded increases the
price of hospital care.

Despite this mutual dependence,

Feldstein is able to use difference equations to prove that
the markets for hospital insurance and hospital care are
stable.
Finally, Feldstein rewrites the welfare loss equation in
order to calculate the magnitude of that loss.
substitutes J for P,

I~

He

(gross price change resulting from

the introduction of insurance), 1\ for

(P,. -Po) I (P, -Pol

(increase in guality as perceived by patients), price
elastic! ty E for

(dX/dkP) (kP/Q)

when that expression is

evaluated at P , and- (P,. -kP.) CJQIJkP)
1

for (Q, -Qo) •

After
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these substitutions welfare loss is expressed as a function

(2)

wL={(1-A) (J-1)

.. -E/2[J{1-kt-C1-A) {J-1)][

(1"A(J-1}-kJ.)J(1.A{J-l»}P~Qo

where J=gross pr ice change from in troduction of insurance
A=guality change as perceived by patients
E=net price elasticity of demand for hospital care
~=original

price

o.=original guan ti ty demanded.

Feldstein assign s several values to the parameters J, A, and
E in order to estimate welfare

1055

for 1969.

His estimates

range from $2.4 billion to $6 billion depending upon hi s
choice of parameter values.

TO calculate welfare loss, as specified above, it is
necessary first to calculate price elasticity of demand.
For this reason, and because one of the purposes of this
paper is to compare the effects of private and public
hospi tal insurance on the dema,nd for hospital care, the
existing literature regarding the demand for hospital care
must be examined.

A particular point of contention in

demand studies is the price elasticity of demand; indeed,
the only conclusicn upon which all studies agree is that

-

price elasticity lies betwe.en 0 and 1.
':)

Also, Phelps and

Newhouse raise the question of functional form--that is, is
linear or log-log form preferable?
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Feldstein estimates the demand equation for
his 1 971 article

~).

1959 - 1965 in

He estimates two basic functions

which are in the logarithms of the variables (except for
variables TIME and MCAID, which are simply linear) :

(3)

log(W =a +b*log(RNP} +c*log(INC)+d*TIME+f*log(DENS) tq*MCAID+ ~

(~)

log CQ) =a +b*log(RP) +c *log (INS) +d*log (INC) +f*T!::1E+q*loq (DENS) +h*MCA.ID+~

wh e re RNP=relative net price (gross price

ti~es

coinsurance rate

deflated by the consumer price index)
BP=relative price (gross pri ce deflated by the consumer
price index)
INS =es timated coinsurance rate (consumer expenditures on
hospital care divided by total

(insurance,qovernment,consumer )

expenditur es on hospital care)
INC=real per capita disposable income
TIHE=timE trend to represent technical progress and changing
~opular

attitudes about hospital care

DEN S =population density
MCAID=dummy

variable equal to 1/12 for each month in which a

state had a Medicaid program in a given year;O otherwise.
Feldstein uses two different dependent variables--rate of
hospital adm iss ions and mean length of stay in days--both of
which are adjusted for demographic
[

composition~

Using

instrumental variables estimation Feldstein obtains relative
net price

el~sticiti es

of admission of -.63 and a relative

18

net price elasticity of s tay of -.49, both of which are
significant at higher than the 99 percent level of
confidence.

When se parate relative price and coin s urance

rate elasticities ar e es timated, the elasticities of
admission are -.55 and -.69, respectively, and the
e lasticities of stay are -.39 and -.58, respectively.

All

of thes€ coefficients are significant at greater than 99
percent .confidence.

Income elasticity of admission is .08

and is s ignificant at 99 percent; income elasticity of stay
is .46 and is significant at higher than 99 percent.

When

relative price and the coinsurance rate are separate
variables, the income elasticity of admission is .015 and
the income elasticity of stay is .378: the former is
insignificant, the latter significant at gr.eater than 99
percent.

Finally, the Medicaid dummy coefficient is -.08 in

the admissions equation and .908 in the mean stay equation;
the former is significant at greater than 99 percent, the
latter insignificant.

When relative price and the

coinsurance rate are treated separately, the Medicaid
coefficient in the admissions equation is -.09 and it is

.006 in the mean stay equation; the former is significant a t
greater than 99 percent, the latter insignificant.
In summary, Feldstein finds significant
elasticities ranging from

-.~9

ne~

price

to -.69, with t .he higher

absolut e values occurring in the admissions rate equation.
Income elasticities are in the .4-.5 range and highly
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significant for the mean stay equation; for the admission s
rate equation, one significant value of .08 is obtained.
The coefficients of the Medicaid dummy are

h~qhly

significant and close to -. 1 in the admissions rate
equations; in the mean stay equations they are
insignificant.

Concerning the

M~dicaid

coefficients,

however, Feldstein rightfully warns that they "should be
regarded with great caution", considering his fairly crude
method of estimation (6,p.860).
Feldstein presents a slightly revised version of this
demand model in 1977

(7).

Despite strong similarities in

specification to his earlier model, Feldstein's 1977 model
yields markedly different estimates.

Two different

functions are used:

(5) log,ADMD)=a+b*log{RNP)+c*log{Q) ta*TIMEte*log(GP} tf*loq(BEDS)
+g*log(DENSI!Y)+h*MCAID+!
(6)

log(MSD)=a+b*log(BNP)+c*loq(Q)+d*log{INC) +f*loq (GP) +g* log(BEDS)
+h*log(DENSITY)+j*MCAID+e,

where ADMD=admissions rate per capita
MSD=mean length of stay in days in the hospital
Q=quality, defined as average cost per patient day,
deflated by an input price index
GP=general practitioners per capita

20

BEDS=the s upply of bed-day s

(365*the

of a vailabl e beds).

numbe~

All other variables are defined as in the 1971 study.
explanation is given for the exclusion of TIME from the
equation and the similar exclusion of INC from the ADMD
equatLon.

Perhaps Feldstein believes that income does not

affect the rate of admissions; if so, why was INC not
included so that its insignificant coefficient cou.ld be
empirically verified?

Another possible explanation is that

INC and TIME are highly correlated.

~p

Instrumental variables

estimation was performed for the periods 1959-1973,
1959-1965, and 1966-1973 for each dependent variabl€.

Net ~ "'-...

price elasticities of admission for the three periods are

""""'- • 2.1

-. 'LO

-.044, -.042, and -.236, respectively; the first and .third
values are significant at the 99 percent level ,the second
is insignificant.

"iy

Net price elasticities of stay are

.02 ' .-080, and .005, respectively; the negative value i s
. X?" •
~ >"~ 'Ignificant at greater than 99 percent.
Quality.

'x P 0/ elastici ties of admission are ,209, .543, and • ~1.J2,
~ r:spectivelY; all are significant at greater than 99
~~

percent.

Quality elasticities of mean stay are -.172, .1)22

and -.200, respectively;the negative values are significant
at greater than 90 percent.

Income elasticities are found

only in the mean stay equation.

Their values are .059,

.053, a nd .038, respectively; the first value is significant
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at the 96

pe~cent

level .

The general p ractitioners

elasticities of stay are .004, .026, and .014, respectively;
the second value is significant at the 93 percent level.
Th'e GP elasticities of stay are -.017, -.022, and -.023,
respectively; the first is significant at 83 perce nt, the
third at 85 percent.

pinally, the MCIIO dummy

coeff~cients

are only estimated for two of the three periods,

1959- 1973

and 1966-1973, as Medicaid did not exist before 1966.

In

the admissions rate equation, the estimated coefficients are
- .0 27 and -.006, respectively; the former is significant at

greater than 99 percent.

In the mean stay equation the

values are .019 and -.006,respectively; the former is
significant at greater than 99 percent.
In summary, the net price elasticity of ad mission is
estima-ted to have markedly increased after the introduction
of Medicaid, with a value of -.2 for 1966-1973.

The net

price elasticity of stay is only signficant for 1959-1965,
when i t has a value of -.08.

Feldstein does not comment

upon the major inconsistency between these estimates and his
197 1 values, which are substantially larger in absolute
value: approximately

+

- • • for mean stay.

1-

-. ~

for admissions and approximatel y

Quality is estimated to have a

significantly positive effect upon admissions and a
significantly negative effect upon length of stay.

The

latter effect probably occurs because quality, as it is
defined in the model and, to some extent, in actuality,
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directly reflects cost.

Income i s estimated to have a

small, s ignificant effect over the entir e period; it s
elasticity is approximately .06.

The availability of

general practitioners increase s the admissions rate and
decreases mean stay; these results are not always
siqnifican t, howe ver.
a crud e

measure~ent~

P ina1l y, the :1edicaid du mmy , altho uqh

has a neqative effect on admissions and

a positivE ODe on mean stay for the entire period.
Bosett and Huang alsD estimate the demand for medical
car e

(20)~

Using 1960 data from the survey of Consumer

Expenditures they first estimate th e expenditure function
for medical care in two equations--one for ,uninsured
households, the ether for insured households:

,

.......
"'

(7)

M=a t bYf·c /tdD + E

(8)

M=a+bY+c!+dD+fktgkYthktc

2.

J.

I!

where M=total household expenditure on medical care
Y=income
D=direct household expenditures on medical care
k =proportion paid by insurer (l-coinsurance rate).

Due to the nature of their data set, Eosett and Huanq were
required to estimate M and k.

Although this slightly

weakens their results,. they acknowledge this shortcoming and
make an effort to calculate the bias which occurs.
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~hile we cannot infer from the results we qet
that k and M, could we observe them both directly,
would te related as the regression says they are, we
can infer that they would be related more
or less as the regression says they are, provided
insurance premiums depend on k and M as hypothesized.
In short, .e have estimated M so as to be consistent
with the assumption that insurance companies calculate
their premiums to reflect their actuarial costs (20,p.287).

Aiter performing a simulation of the relationship between

~

and k,

they suggest that their estimating procedure introduces a downward

\

bias in the slope of approximately 10 percent; that is, M is biased
downward by about 10 percent.

After estimating the expenditure

~ --------

expenditur~,,----- _ _ _

into a demand equation by

artifici~lly

creating a quantity

variable whose units have a price of 51.00 each.
The transformed equation is:

(9)

Q=a+bY+cl'+drtfrYtglth.z tjzrtkzl.t:

where r=l-k=coinsurance rate
Z=a .normally distributed random variable with a zero
mean and a standard deviation, Gi.

The estimated coefficients of this demand function are:
~

-~

Y,

~

.94181; Y, -.3026 X 10; r, 625.1; rY, .03031; r, 468.17; Z,
1.

876.48; Zr, -876.48; and Zr, 219.12.
provided.

}

~===--

~~

function, Rosett and Huan'g transform
equation (8)

._--------_.

-~----

No standard errors are

By substituting a range of values for Z a family
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of demand curves is created, each corresponding to a certain
distributional level of insurance-holding.

'From these

demand functions price and income elasticities are
generated.

Estimated demand e ~~ies vary from -.35

for r=.2 to -1.5 for r=.S.
from .25 for 1=$4,000 to

.~5

Income elasticity estimates vary CLp
for Y=$10,000.

Finally, from

these · elasticities, Rosett and Huang calculate a crude
"measure of household welfare loss for given levels of income
and coinsurance rates.

The loss which they compute is the

difference between marginal cost and utility value to the
consumer as he moves down the demand curve, a move induced
by insurance.

One example of this type of analysis which

they cite is that, by their es timation, a family with income
of $7,000 paid 2.5 times the actuarial value of a

~

k-ess te fJE'etect it:se±£ aq-a-:i:-n-st i) "highly probable" $110
loss. t. : ... s,"", ~~'\ ~~\ \\..:~
Finally,

Phel~s

'l_.

and Newhouse also estimate the demand

for hospital care (19).

Prior to this estimation, however,

th-ey di::cuss several theoretical aspects of the demand for
hospi tal care.

They sim ply state two relationships which

are derived elsewhere.

The se are:

{t)the elasticity of

demand with respect to the gross price of medical care is
egual to the elasticity of demand with respect to the
coinsurance 'rate, and (2) the elasticity of demand with
respect to the consumer' s wage is equal to the elasticity of
demand with respect to time allotted per unit of medical
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care consumed.

From these relationships Phelps and Newhouse

draw seven implicaticns, one of which is of particular
relevance in this research.

They state:

Goods with proportionally high time-price / components
and nearly complete insurance coverage (~insurance rate 1
near zero) will show relatively small mobey-price
and coinsurance elasticities and relatively high
time-price elasticities •• ~.Hospital days might
••• be an example, although if one is seriously ill
enough to be hospitalized, the opportunity cost of time
will generally fall and with it the time-price (19,p.335).
This hypothesis has implications for the interpretation of
price elasticity and for the treatment of time-price in this
research, both of which will be discussed later.

Phelps and

NewhousE present the demand elasticities for hospital care
using beth

~dmisssions

variables.

~bey

rate and mean stay as dependent

use, Connecticut data for the period

1966-1968, a period in which a change in the coinsurance

rate took place.
'
d ~scover
an

1

Employing a linear specification they
t'

1,;. m1ss~ons
-'tVJ\'
y 0 f a d""

ea~c~

elasticity of mean stay of -.02.

0

f

- . 05

an d an

(No in£ormation is given

on significance.) These figures are arc elasticities
computed over the range of zero to 25 percent coinsurance
which they designate "policy relevant"..

As a result of

their findings, Phelps and Newhouse reject the null
hypothesis that price has no effect on the consumption of
hospital care.

The scenario which they reject is one in

which the physician makes all

choices regarding the amount
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of care his Fatient consumes; that is, price is irrelevant
to the consumer.

Bather, price has a small but siqnificant

negative effect on the consumption of hospital care.
finally, they raise the issue of functional form.
assu~elinear

They

demand curves (as do Bosett and Huang),

although constant elasticity form is more typical.

Of this

distinction they comment,

We de not know hew sensitive the results in the
literature are to this assumption
[constant elasticity]: because our results generally
come from the observation of two points, we are
not well equipped to test for differences in functional
form.
However, we believe our results
are accurate for the ranges given (19,p.335).
It is evident in surveying the literature-of demand
estimation that substantial disagreement exists regarding
the price elasticity of demand for hospital care.

Although

most if not all economists agree that the elasticity of
demand lies between zero and negative one, and is
significantly different from zero, estimates vary widely as
to its value within that range.
of elasticities (6)

Feldstein's early estimates

range from -.39 to -.69 depending upon

which specification is used, elasticities of admission
falling within the more negative end of that range.

These

estimates are fairly consistent with those of Rosett and
Huang, who-find that demand elasticity is -.35 when a 20
percent coinsurance rate is in effect.

Phelps and NeWhouse,
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however, dis FU te these es tima te s and maintain tha t
elasticity is much lcwet" in absolute value:

the tt"ue

-.02 or -. 0 5 ,

depending on which quantity measure is chosen.

Feldstein

contradicts his own 1971 estimates in a later article (7),
offering estimates ranging from -.04 to -.2 for different
time periods and specifications.

Mysteriously, Feldstein' s

1977 model is almost identical to his 1971 version, the
major difference being the inclusion of q uality as an
independent variable.

Furthermore, Feldstein even sampl es

the same time period (1959-1965) in both studies, but
obtains strikingly divergent results: -.63 and -.49 for
admissions rate apd mean stay, respectively, in the earlier
study, compa red with -.042 and -.080 in the later study.
perhaps this

i~consistency

is attributable to the different

methods used to construct the coinsurance t"ate in each
study.

In the 1971 papet Feldstein defines the coinsuran ce

rate as!

(10)

INS= (consumer: expenditures on hospital care) / (insurance +qovernment+
consumer expenditures on hospital care)

The 1977 paper contains a another definition!

(11-)

INS=PENE*PCCINS •. (1-PENR) G*GCOINS
where PEtJR=proporticn of population enrolled in pri vate
health insurance plus Medicare
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PCOINS=average coinsurance rate of private s ubscribers
GCOIN S= ~~oportion

of hospital costs of those without insuran c e

that are not paid by government programs but must
be paid by the uninsured themsel ves .

Although Feldstein fails to include Medicaid coverage as

well as Medicare coverage, Medicaid benefits are a
relatively small .f raction cftotal hospital insurance
benefits, and thus are almost certainly not the cause of the
major difference in estimates.

Because the coinsurance rate

he calculates is a national average, Feldstein admits that
the "adequacy of this estimate will be limited bV the extent
to which the effective c oinsurance rate for private
insurance and the comprehensiveness of government hospital
insurance for the po~r differ among the states"

(7,p.1692).

He fails, however, to discuss the full implication s of th ese
state-to-state differences on his net price elasticity
estimates, and generally ignores the contradictory results
of his earlier work.
Greater agreement seems to exist on income elasticities.
Feldstein obtains a mean stay elasticity of .08 and
admissions rate elasticities in the .4-.5 range in his 1971
study.

The 1917 study includes income only in the

v-.~s~

~·j.-s·S±S-o:n;s

~ equatiQn; it s coefficient is .6.

In

addition, Rosett and Huang find income e lasticity to vary
from .25 to .45 depending upon income.

29
Little a ttempt has teen mad e to measure the relatiave
effect s of public and private hospital insurance on the
demand for hospital care.

Feldstein' s admittedly crude

Medicaid dummy variable does have a s ignificantly neqative
sign, leading Feldstein to conclude that "Medicaid does not
increase the admissions rate by as much as an egual amount
of private insurance

~ould"

(7,p.1696).

This deduction

seems tenuou s , as to merely indicate the presence or absence
af

M ~dicaid

reveals nothing abcut its relative proportion

and effects.
Finally, functional form, althouqh not the sub;ect of
much debate, is an area of

~isagreement

in the literature.

No attempt has been made, however, to justify the use of

e1 ther log-leg or li near . demand form.
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Chapter

.....
II • •

l'

The model of the market for hospital services
analyzed in this Faper hopefully

w~ll

•

W.11~Cll

•

loS

prpvide more definite

answers to the unresolved questions posed by previous de mand
studies.

Moreover, an attempt will be made to measure the

effects of the di .f feren·t J:uhlic-pri vate insurance mixes
which characterizE the various states.

That is,

w~at

is the

effect on demand of a smaller (or larger) proportion of
public insurance?

Is the behavior of public insurance

beneficiaries revealed to differ from the behavior of
private insurance beneficiaries?

!nswers to these

questions, in addition to estimates of price and income
elasticities of demand, will then provid e a framework within
which to comment upon such issues as the Reagan
Administration's recent Medicare proposal and the inherent
problems with insurance contracts, especially private ones,
as they are · formulated today.
The model which represents the market for hospital
services consists of two equations, although only the demand
equation will be specified in detail.
is:

The demand arqumen t.
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Lo,<Q)
(1 2) j\ (2=a+b*log (NPBI) +c*log(OAGE) +d*log (INC) +f*log (OU'l'P)

+g*log (GPS) th*log (MALE) +;*log (i,HIT) +k*log (PPRV) +l*loq (CA~C) .. l...
where NPRI=relati ve average total price of one day of hospi tal care
CAGE=proportion of people 65 and over
INC=real per capita income
COTP=number of outpatient facilities per capita
GPs=number of non-federal general practitioners per capita
~ALE=proportion

of males

WHIT=~roportion

of whites

FPRV=proportion of total hospital ,insurance benefits comprised
by private hospital insurance benefits

CANC=rate of death from cancer (per 100,000 population).

The supply argument is:

(13) Q=Q(NPRI,SAL,PINP,INT,HSP)
where

SAL=rea~

average salary of full-time hospital personnel

PINP=a vector of prices for all non-labor inputs
INT=rate of interest on purchased capital
HSP=number cf hospitals per capita.

As

~n

other studies, two quantity measures are used:

admissions

per capita and mean lenqthof stay in days.
observations were collected for the five-year period
1973-1977 for the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
These 255 observations were extracted from a number of

1?
-'-

different statistical sources; in addition, many variable s
were constructed from several individual figures.
Therefore, a detailed description and definition of the
variables in the model is warranted.
Admissions rate per capita

(AD~I)

is the constructed

quotient of total annual hospital admissions and population.
The number of admission s was taken from

llQ~ital

Statis1i£§,

the annual publication of the American Hospital Association.
Population data was taken from the

Relative net price of

~tisti~21 ~~!~£1

Ql

hospital services CNPEI) is the

constructed product of gross (total)

price 6f one day of

hospitalization and the coinsurance rate--the proportion of
the price paid by the consumer-- divided by the consumer
price index.

(This price is, of course, strictly a

money-price; the issue of time-price is considered
elsewhere.)

The coinsurance rate itself is also a

constructed variatle.

It s formula is:

(14 ) CC~N='-(PRIV.MCAR.MCAI)/PAY

where PEIV=real total private insurance hospi ta I benefit s paid
MCAR=real total Medicare hospi tal benefit s paid
I1CAI=real total Medicaid hospital benefits paid
PAy=real total payments for hospital care, both direct
by individuals, and indirect through all

forms of hospital insurance.
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Thus the

second term on the right side of the equation is

the fraction of total hospital expenditures covered by all
forms of insurance; when it is subtracted from one th,e
coinsurance rate remains.

All coinsurance rates calculated

are individual state rates, rather than one national rate,
which Feldstein uses.

This provides a much more accurate

measure of state-to-state differences in insurance coverage.
PBlV was constructed by taking total health insurance
benefits paid in each state from the §ource Book .Qi Health
Insurance Data

-

(Health Insurance

-

Institute) and multiplying it by the proportion

~hich

hospital benefits are of total health benefits for the
nation, which was taken from

Healt~ £~~ lin~ing

Revi~~.

As a result, this estimate is biased for states whose
residents receive proportionally more or less hospital
coverage.

Medicare values were taken from the

~tati~~ical

Abstract

Medicaid values were taken from Medical

•

Assistance Financed Under Title XIX
Ac~.

Total payments were taken from !!.Q§Ei tal Statistics.
Because PAY values applied to community

hospitals, while PRIV, MCAR, and MCAI values applied to all
hospitals, PAY was multiplied by the national ratio of total
hospital expenditures to community hospital expenditures for
each year.

Thus, this estimate does not account for

di~ferences

in community hospital market share across

states.
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The

p~oPQrtion

of people 65 and over (GAGE) was taKen

from the Statistical Abstract.

Actual percentages were

available for 1975-1977;OAGE was constructed for
by dividing the number of people 65 and over

~y

1973-1974
the

estimated population.

Per capita income was taken from the

d~~tiSsl

and was deflated by the consumer

Abstr~.

price index to obtain real per capita income (INC).

Per

capita income values were based on nominal income estimates
developed for Federal r e venue-sharing allocations.
Outpatient facilities per capita (OUTP)
dividin~

the

n~mber

of "organized outpatient departments"

per state by population.
facilities was found in

The number o .f outpatient
BOS.Ei~l

practitioners per capita
analogous to OUTP.

was constructed by

(GPS)

~tatis!i£2.

General

was calculated in a manner

The number of non-federal general

practitioners (no information wa s available on federal
general practitioners) came from
M~dical_licensure

Phys!cia~

in the United State§.

2istributign ani
, an annual

American Medical Association publication.
The proportion of males (MALE) and the proportion of
whites (WHIT) in each state vere found in

Q~m2g~phic,

social, and Economic Prof ile of .:Ehe .§ta te2.·

Unfortunatel y,

this data only applied to 1976, and other years were not
available.

Because it is reasonable to assume, however,

that these proportions changed little in most states within
five years, the 1976 value for each state was used each
year.
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The proportion

which private

hospit~l

insurance

nenefit s comFrise of total hospital insurance benefits
(PPRV)

was computed by taking the quotient of total priva t e

insurance hospital benefits --(PBlV), and the sum of PRIV,
total Medicaid hospital benefits

(MCAl), and total Medicare

hospi tal benefits (MCAR) .
The rate of death frem cancer (CANC)
~!j,§.!.icaJ.

was taken from the

Abstract and it measu.r es the number of annual

deaths from malignant neoplasms per 100,000 population.
Data was also collected for the two instruments used to
conduct two-stage least squares reqressionsa _ The first
instrument is average salary of full-time hospital personnel
(SAL) •

This data was taken frem

selecteg Community Hospital

l!Q§Ei~al

ll!dic~.Q£.a,

Hospital Association pUblication.

Statistics and

another American

SAL is the quotient of

payroll and total full-time hospi tal personnel.

SAL was

directly available for 1975-1976, and was computed for 1973,

, 9 7 4 , an d 19 7 7 •
Finally, the number of hospitals per capita (HSP) was
constructed by dividing tetal hospitals by total population.
The number of hospitals was found in !!osEital
/

/

~t!stic2.

Defined as such, what do these variables purport to

measure, and why were they chosen rather than other
conceivable alternatives?
be

measu~ed

in

seve~al

The quantity of hospital care can

different ways --admissions rate,

mean length of stay, or patient days demanded, which is the
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product of the first twa.

Both admisssions rate and mean

s tay are preferable to patient days demanded preci se ly
because the act of entering a ho s pi tal and the length of
time which one stays ar e two different things.

Thus, in

constructing patient days demanded, a state with low
admissions aDd lang

~tays

will appear the same as a state

with high admissions and short stays, when in reality, two
very different sets of societal preferences are revealed.
Because patient days demanded obscures this difference,
admisssions rate and mean stay ar e better measures.

Is one

of these two measures s uperior to the other as an index of
the demand fcr hospital care?

To attempt to answer this

question, on e must e xamine the nature of product which
hospital care is.

Unlike that for most products, the

revealed behavior of con s umption of hospital care is not
completely the result of the consumer' s own decision.
Instead, the asymmetry of information between physician and
patient regarding the latterts medical condition
necessitates that the patient all6w the physician to act as
his agent.
is

As noted above, however, the agency relationship

incompl~te;

one consequence of this incompleteness is the

prescription of unnecessary care, which if the patient were
fully informed (or had to pay more of the cost), would not
be consumed.

On the cthe r hand, because individuals are

able to obtain "second opinions" and possess some knowledge
of the seriousness of ailments and neccesity of treatment,
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they retain some decision-making po wer.

Because the

specification of a demand function attempts to explain the
factors which affect demand, it is most desirable to choose
a definition of guantity demanded whose value is the most
affected by individual choice.

Indeed, if the individual

has limited choice regarding the quantity he consumes as
measured in a particular way, the determinants of demand,
i.e., price, income, etc., while actually having little
effect upon demand, may appear to significantly affect
demand in statistical testing.

Thus, the best definition

for quantity demanded is one wh ich is influenced by
individual choice; that is, a definition of guantity
demanded such that it systematically varies with variations
in its determinants.

Although both the admissisons rate and

mean stay are chosen for the patient, to some extent, by
physiCians, both contain some elements of choice, and
compelling arguments can be presented that each is more of a
choice variable than the ether.

A physician's

recommendation is not sufficient to ensure that his patient
will choose hospital admission; the patient may decide
otherwise based upon a

II

second opinion", his own positive

assessment of his condition, or fear.

In many cases, the

choice to admit is the individual's.

Mean length of stay,

alternatively, is pre-determined to a large extent, as many
procedures have a standard operating and recovery time.
Moreover, the individual is more likely to accept his
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physician's ;udgment regarding his prescribed length of
stay; he is hospitalized, so part of the decision has been
wade already, and, more importantly, he is more likely to
accept his physician's recommendation to stay longer , as
evidenced by his Frior acceptance of his physician's
judgment regarding admittance.

' On the other hand, 'p:e rhaps

length of stay is more of a choice variable than admission.
The two opticns of admission and Don-admission are much more
extreme than, say, the two options of a seven-day
an

eight~day

stay.

st~y

and

As a result, individuals probably

"choose" to be admittEd when they do not need to be as a
precautionary measure; the alternative of non-admisssion is
perceived to be much riskier.

Furthermore, besides the risk

perceived by the patient, the risk perceived by his
physician may lea~ him to insist that his patient be
admitted.

.

Thus, because the patient is consuming basically

the same product
more,

~hether

be stays one day less or one day

while he does net consume the product at all if he is

not admitted, perhaps length of stay is a matter about which
the patient has mere choice.
Reasons for the inclusion of the other variables are
more . straightforward.
be included.

Demand theory stipulates that price

To control for the effects of general

in£lation, gross price is deflated by the consumer price
ind~x.

This re.lative price is then multiplied by the

coinsurance rate so that it measures the effective price to
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the consumer.

Because hospital care is certainly not a

Giffen good, the coefficient of net price is expected, !
to be significan tly negati ve®

priori,

The proportion of

population 65 and over is included to control for the effect
~hich

age has upen rate cf hospitalization.

deterioration which

accom~anie~

is expected to be significantly

Because of the

age, the coeficient of OAGE

Positive~ncome

is

positively related to demand in traditional theory; in the
market for hcspital care, however,

it~

role is more complex.

If hosFital care is not aD inferior good Ca very reasonable

C:::-V?j
. ~}?'

assumption), then demand theory suggests that demand will
increase with income.

as

well.

...

While this effect is certainly

present with regard to hospital care,
e£fects

\.--r
(""

\J

there are two other

Fi<st. Feople with hiqhe< income

i!

qeneraIJ~

have mare education, and may engage in mare preventive
activity as a result.

/
I

Second, if we assume that all people
,

I:

i

work the same number of hours per week, then per capita
income measures the average time-price of hospital care.

I
1

V/

'~J"

v
~7

//

"

I

I

j

'

Accor:dingly, those people with a higher opportunity cost of
time will consume less care.

All income effects may be

muted, however, due to the fact that the population sampled
is state averages rather than individual values, thus
eliminating the wide dispersion which is present in a random
sample of individuals.
to predict the sign or

Because of all this, it is difficult
significanc~

of the intome

coefficient, although it is suspected to be positive and

"

\j~ x/"

/JVtlJ

/

'

!

'

?'

61'

".

significant , as others have found.

Tbe availability of

outpatient facilities and general practitioners both appear
to have ambiguous effects on demand, as each has qualities
of both substitutes and complements.

Availability, as

measured by cutpa tient faci Ii ties and general practitioners
per capita, is used instead of price, because, as Feldstein
notes, price does not ration these services; persistent

-

--...

,....."...

excess demand suggests that availability plays the most
important role in rationing thsseservices (7).

An

outpatient facility can either complement inpatient care,
following one's release from the hospital, or serve as a
sUbstitute for it, as

sim~lar

procedures can be performed

without necessitating hospitalization.

A visit to a general

practitioner can result in the prescription of
hospitalization, and is thus complementary, or may actually
take the place of hospital care, thus functioning as a
substitute.

Because the SUbstitution effects seem stronqe.I:'

than the complementary ones, the signs of both coefficients
ar€ expected to be negative, and because outpatient care is
a closer substitute for inpatient hospital care than general
practitioner care, its coefficient viII be more
significant.

h~ghly

Hospitalization statistics indicate that women

are more freguent ly has pi talized than men, even after
obstetric care is removed from the total.

Therefore, the

coefficient of MALE is expected to be significantly
negative.

A higher propertion of whites is expected to

J
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1

produce a higher demand for hospitalization, due primarily \
to hiqher emfloyment. and thus. more likely participation in )
groups health insurance, and higher education.

T~is

coefficient is expected to be significantly positive.

The

coefficient of PPBV, the proportion of total hospital
insurance benefits comprised by private insurance hospital
benefits, is expected to be negatively significant.

This is

primarily because the large maiority of public insurance
benefits (Medicare benefits) are paid to people with
relatively lew cost of time.

,

That is, the elderly are much ji

less likely tc be employed than are people who are covered
by private hospital insurance, who are generally younger.

Because opportunity cost of time is probahly not captured
too well in the per capita income variable, its effects are
likely to be manifested in the PPRV' coef.f icient.

Another

possible reason, although certainly less siqnificant, is
that

the emphasis of Medicaid and Medicare coverage is on

tbe early stages of treatment, whie private insurance often
offers a deductible which only takes effect after a certain
level of expenditure has been reached.
proportion of public

hos~ital

Thus, a higher

insurance benefits is expected

to increase the rate of admissions.

(The full ramifications

of this hypothesis are discussed in Chapter 7.) The rate of
death frem cancer (CANC)
ocurrence of all cancer

is a proxy for the rate of
(terminal and otherwise), and its

coefficient is expected to be significantly positive.

If

~
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the propertion which cancer deaths are of all cancer ca.ses
is relatively constant across states, then rate of death is
an acceptable proxy.

More generally, this variable is

intended to measure differences in occurrence of disease
across states.

Because cancer is so prevalent and because

it reflects environmental, occupational, and behavioral
differences among states, it is a good proxy for the whole
vector of diseasEs which distinguish states.
two instruments must be justified.

Finally, the

Average real salary of

full-time hospital personnel is a determinant of the supply

,~. of .hospital care, and is considered exogenous in its use as

,+o/t
~

an instrument for

two-st~ge

least squares. although i t is to

. some extent derived from the demand for hospital care.
Average salary is a proxy for average hourly wage; thus, it
is assumed that the -average number of annual hours worked by
hospital employees is the same across states.

Hospitals per

capita is also considered exogenous, as the number of
hospitals is not very responsive to current
demand-and-supply condi tions because of barriers to entry,
both economic and regulatory.

High capital costs is an

example of the former; certificate-of-need-regulations an
example of the latter.
After the two versions of the demand equation are
estimated, several types of tests will be performed.

First,

the value and significance of all coefficients will be .
examined, and compared with

hy~otheses

made regarding the
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coefficisnts.

Three coefficients are of particular

interest--those corresponding to relative net price, income,
and the

~roportion

total benefits.
hospital care?

which private insurance benefits are of

Just how price-elastic is the demand for
Does income have a sigificant effect?

so, what is the direction of that effect?

If

What effect do es

an increase in the proFortion of public insurance benefit s
have?

Cf additional interest are the comparative maqnitudes

and significance of the coefficients in each equation.
one of the

t~o

Does

specifications generally have smaller and/or

less significant coefficients?

If the coefficients of one

of the two equations are generally less siqnificant, some
evidence is Frovided regarding the relative statu s of the
dependent variable used in that specification as a choice
vaciable.

If the consumer has absolutely no choi ce

regarding the quantity which he consumes of of a good, one
expects all af the elasticities with respect to that good to
not .be significantly differe·nt from zero.

Thus, if the

consumeI has relatively less choice about the amount of his
consumption of a good, as measured in a particular way, one
expects the coefficients of that equation to be less
s ignificant than the coefficients of another equation, which
is defined in terms of a dependent variable about which the
consn~er

has greater choice.

Hopefully, the regression

results will provide some resolution concerning the deqree
of choice connected with admissions and length of stay.
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From this conclusion, policy implications will be able to be
drawn regarding the potential chanqe in consumption by
either measure which would occur if patient incentives were
altered.

policy implications will also be suggested by the

price elasticitiEs and the proportion of private insurance
e lasticities, such as, what would be the efect of an
increase in the proportion of private insurance benefits
paid?

Also, the income elasticities may imply something

about the net effect of the many hypothesized income
effects.

pinally, using estimates of net price elasticity

of demand and the average coinsurance rate, the welfare qain
of increasing the coinsurance rate will be calculated.

The

validity of this estimat e will then be considered in light
of Felds tein's definition of welfare loss , and an improved
definition of welfare loss will be offered.
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Two-sta'ge least squares reqressions were cond u cted usinq
admissions rate and mean stay as dependent variables.
Complete regressicn results ar e listed in Table 1.

I n the

admissions rate specification five coefficients are
siqnificant at higher than the 90 percent level, and one
other coefficient is significant at hiqher than the 8 0
percent level.

The five coefficients siqnificant at higher

than 90 percent correspond to the variables relative net
price (NPBI), real per capita income (INC), proportion of
males (MALE), proportion of whites (WHIT), and proportion of
private insurance hospital benefits of total hospital'
insurance benefit s

(PPRV).

The net price e lasticity of

admissions is estimated to be -.604, and its correspondinq
t-statistic is -2.598, indicating that the coefficient is
significantly different from zero at approximately the 99
percent level.

The income elasticity of admissions is

-.393, and its t-statistic is -2.580, indicating
significance at the 99 percent level.

The proportion of

males coefficient is -2.32 1, and its t-statistic is -2.206 ,
indicating Significance at the 97 percent level.

The

proportion of whites coefficient is .763, and i'ts
t-statistic is 2.302, indicating siqnificance at close to
the 98 percent level.

Finally, the proportion of private
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insurance coefficient is

-~053,

and its t-statistic is

-1.834, indicating significance at the 93 percent level.
The

othe~

fairly significant coefficient is that

corresponding to the outpatient facilities per capita
variable.

Its value is -.110, and its t-statistic is

- t.441, indicating significance at the 84 percent level.
The coefficients of the variables measuring proportion
of the population 65 and over, general practitioners per
capita, and the rate of death from cancer, as well as the
constant term are insignificant.
and its t-statistic is .489.

The constant term is .819

The proportion of the

population 65 and over coefficient is .035 and its
t-statistic is .460.

The general practitioners per capita

coefficient is -.121 and its t-statistic is -.790.

Finally,

the rate of death from cancer coefficient is -.217 and its
t-statistic is -.872.
In the mEan length of stay specification, all but one of
the coefficients are signficant at the 80 percent level, and
all but two are significant at the 90 percent level.

The

constant term is -20.230 and its t-statistic is -1.686,
indica tin 9 significance a t slightly above the 90 percent
level.

The net J;rice elastici ty of sta y is -4.844, and its

t-statistic is -2.905,indicating significance at well above
the 99 percent level.

The income elasticity of stay is

1.690 and its t-statistic is 1.547, indicating significance
at the 87 percent level.

The outpatient facilities per

capi-ta coeff icient is - 1. 190 and its t-stat istic is - 2. 17 1,
indicating significance at the 97 pe.ccent level.

The

general practitioners per capita coefficient is -2.561, and
its t-statistic is -2.334, indicating significance at the 98
percent level.

The propertion of males coefficient is
~

-17.411 and its t-statistic is -2.307, indicating
significance at almost the 98 percent level.

J\I

The proportion \

of whites coefficient is 7. 010, and its t-statistic is
2.948~

indicating significance at well above the 99 percent

level.

The proportien of private insurance coefficient is

-.483, and its t-statistic is -2.331, indicating
significance at the 98 percent level.

The rate of death

from cancer coefficient is -4.416, and its t-statistic is
-2.479, indicating significance at the 98.5 percent level.
The only insignificant coefficient is that corresponding to
the proportion of people 65 and over variable.
• 126, and its t-statistic is .229.

Its value is

REGRESSION 1:

VARIABLE

MS'IY DEPENDENT VARIABLE;-

ESTIMATED COEFFlCIENT

t '-STA TISTIC

-20.230

- 1. 6 U6

SPItI

-4 .. 844

-2.905

OAGE

.. 126

.229

C

INC

1. 690

OUTP

-1. J90

- 2. 171

GPS

-2.561

-2.334

rULE

-17 .. 411

-2.307

WHIT

7 .. 010

2.948

PPfV

- .483

-2.331

CANC

-4.416

-2.479

SUo OF SQUARED BESIDUALS=1908
ERBeR CI RBGRESS10N=2 .. 791

STA~DABD

REGRESSION 2:

c

ADMI DEPENDE3T VARIABLE

.. 819

RPEr

-.604

OAGE

.035

.489
-2~

598

.. l~

60

INC

- .. 393

-2.580

OUTP

- . 110

- 1.441

GPS

-. 121

- .. 790

- 2.321

- 2.206

;'iALE

WHIT

• 763

2. 302

l?PI:V

-. 0 53

- 1.834

CA~C

.- .211

SUH OF SQUARED RESIDUALS=37.09

STAtDAfD ERBOR OF BEGRESSION=.3891

-• 872
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Close examination and interpretation of the regression
resu.lts produces some striking and provocative conclusions.
~

In general, the elasticities of mean stay are much greater
than the elasticities of admission, many by a factor of
eig.ut or more.

.

j

As already mentioned, the mean :>tay equation

also has more significant

~nd

more highly significant

coefficients than the admissions rate equation.

This

general pattern is probably due to the greater deqree of
choice associated with length of stay, as opposed to
admission.

Because people have more choice with respect to

length of stay, they are thus more responsive to the many
factors which determine their length of stay.

Indeed, a

marginal effect is present with respect to mean stay that is
not present with respect to admissions.

Certainl y, the

difference between seven and eight days in the hospital is
much less than that between admission and non-admisssion.
Many people who would not consider non-admission a viable
altern'ative would, however, attempt to shorten their length
of stay in response to the net price or opportunity cost of
an additional day.

The net price elasticity of admissions

of -.604 is quite consistent with Feldstein's 1971 estimate
of -.63, although it is much larger in absolQte value than
Feldstein's 1977 estimates, which

rang~

from -.042 to -.236,

~.?

6"?
. ,r'''\
./

,
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depending upon which period of time is sampled {-.236
applying to 1966-1973).

!he net price elasticity of

admission .found in this research means that the demand for
admission to the hospital does not respond much to the
effective price faced.

The net price elasticity of stay is

much larger in absolute value ,however.

Its value of -4.844

indicates relatively high responsiveness to changes in the
effective price of one day of hospital care.

By contrast,

Feldstein obtains net price elasticities of stay of -.5 in
his 1971 study and -.08 in his 1977 study.

These

es~imates

imply that not only is net price elasticity of stay

~ inelastic,

7t

but i t is'lQnerally less elastic than net price

elasticity of admission.

This st udy, alternatively,

suggests that the consumer is more responsi ve to t .he price
he pays in ch60sing (if he can) his length of .stay than in
c hoosing (if he can) whether to be admitted.
Also provocative ar e the income elasticities.

The only

coefficient to change sign in the two regressions (besides
the constant term), the income elasticity o.f admission is
-.393 and income elasticity of stay is 1.690.

are significant, although the --elastici t.I_of

-

more highly significant.
<

..--

Both values

admiss ~

~

Peldstein's inc ome elasticity of

admission is .08 and is s ignificant '.

The negative

elasticity of admission found here can perhaps be ascribed
. to the two negative income effects described earlier.

If

so, then the effects of hypothesized preventive behavior and

~
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higher 0fPortunity cost of time outweiqh
th e traditional normal good effect.

Th e

income elasticity of stay is somewhat consistent with
previous estimates, which are in the
usually significant.

.~-.6

range, and a r e

The estimated value of 1.690 in this

study, however, implies that demand for marginal days of
stay is income elastic.

1/(

'Ibis finding i s in conflict with / ' .

the existing literature, wherein the d e mand for ma.rginalJ
days i s estimated to be income inelastic.
The propcrtioD of private insurance benefits coefficient
is negative in both specifications tested, assuming values
of -.053 in

~he

admissions rate equation and -.483 in the

mean s tay eguation, and both are significant.

Thi s means

that the greater the propertion of private insurance
benefits paid in a state, the lower will be the admission s
rate and the mean length of stay,

ce!2ri~ E.~ri12u2.

Considered another way, these results mean that a given
amount of putlic hospital insurance benefits has larger
effect cn both measures of demand than does the same amount
of private hospital benefits.
a~proximates

Feldstein crudely

the effects of Medicaid on demand bV including

a dummy variable which indicates the presence or absence of
aedicaid in a given state in a given year.

He obtains a

significant Fositive coefficient when mean stay is the
dependent variable and a Significant negati ve coefficient
when admissicns rate is the dependent variable.

From thi s ,
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he concludes tha t

~M edicaid

does not increase the

adm~ssionS

rate by as much as an equal amount of private insurance
\IIould"

P,p. J696).

This deductio n seems spurious, howev e r,

since Feldstein does not measure the actual amounts of
privat e and public

hos~ital

insurance benefits paid, as is

done in this study.
S urprisingly, the coeficent corresponding to the
proportion of the population over 65 variable is
insignificant, although it is positive.

Because of the

tendency of the elderly to have longer hospital stays, one
would particularly have antipicated a significant aqe effect
on mean stay.

Instead, the age coefficient is insignificant

in both cases.

If this finding i s consistent with reality,

perhaps it represents availability problems,

i.e.~

inability

to get to the hospi tal, the unwillinqess of t,he elderly to
seek treatment, or their inability to recognize that t .hey
are ill.
The general practitioners per capita coefficient is
- . 121 and insignificant for the admissions rate
specification and -2.561 and significant for the mean stay
specification.

~his

difference indicates that general

practitioners serve as a much better substitute for the
marginal day in the hospital than for admission to the
hospital.

T hat is, while' general practitioners cannot

perform most procedures which patients undergo in a
hospital, agreement to visit onefs

genera~

practitioner may
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allow one to be released earlier.

Feldstein

(7) sho ws

general practitioners to be a substitute for marginal
hospital days, although his elasticiti es are around -.02,
much smaller in absolut e value.

He also estimtes that

~\

general pn,aactitioners
are a complement to hospital
"...._.,)'
..

admissions, as his GP coefficient is .03.

This

complementary relationship e.x:istslihen one enters a hospital
based upon his general practitioner's advice.
outpatient facilitie s are also estimated to act as a
substitute fer hospitalization, measured both in terms of
admissions and length o f stay.

The outpatient elasticity of

admissions is -.110, and is fairly significant
level)

(94 percent

while the elasticity of mean stay is -1.190, and i s

significant

(97 percent level).

Similar to general

practitioners, ootpatient facilities are a better sUDstitute
for marginal days in the hospital than for admissions.

In

addition, outpatient facilities appear to be a better
substitute for

ad~ission

than general practitioners, as, in

the admissions equation, the coefficient of OUTP is
significant, while the GPS coefficient is not.
The significant negative value of the proportion of
males coefficient in both cases is consistent with
statistical evidence which indica tes that women demand more ,\
hospital care than men, even after obstetric care has been
removed.

\

Both elasticities are relatively large (-2.321 fOr )

ADMl and -17.411 for MSTY), indicating that a one percent
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increase in the Froportion of women leads to a 2.321 percent
increase in admissions and a staggering 17.411 percent
increase in average length of stay.

Whether this sexual

difference in hospi tal use is ca used by di£ferences in ra tes
of illness or in rreferences is unknown; this provides an
interesting guestion for future research, if an accurate
method of preference measurement can be determined.
The propertion of whites has a siqificantly positive
effect en both admissions and mean stay, particularly the
latter.

Indeed, a one percent increase in the proportion of

whites leads to a 7.010 percent increase in average lenqth
of stay.

This finding is probably most attributable to the

generally higher level of education attained by whites, and
the positive relationship between education and consumpti.on
of heal th care.

Tha t is, educa tion em phasi zes the value of

good health and pcrtrays medical science as beneficial and
safe.

Those with less

educ~tion,

on the other hand,

probably tend to reject science and to fear

medic~l

procedures as mysterious and dangerous.
Finally, the coefficient of the cancer variable is
surprisingly negative in both specifications.

In fact, in

the mean stay specification the coefficient is -4.416 and is
significant at almost the 99 percent level.

Perhaps cancer

patients who eventually die have shorter stays because they
die guickly or because they are released when their
condi tion' is realized to be hopeless.

still, one suspects
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that the

relationshi~

between cancer patients and cancer

deaths is fairly constant across states, thus makinq the
death'rate a good proxy for the actual rate of cancer.
Perhaps the rate of death from cancer is highly correlated
with ene of the other independent variables, causing its
coefficient to be biased.
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The results generated by the model of the market for
hospital care presented in this paper have important
implications for the structure and magnitude of public as
well as private hospital insurance programs.

One

application of the results of this research can be made to
the Beagan Administration's recent proposal to alter the
benefit emphasis of the Medicare program.

At present

Medicare beneficiaries pay the full price of the first day
of hospitilization ($304 in 1982) and are then completely
covered for days two through sixty.

After sixty days,

Medicare recipients are Fartially covered for additional
days, subject to a constraint of sixty such days per
lifetime.

The Reagan proposal contains a significant shift

from full short-term coverage to full long-term,
"catastrophic" coverage.

The plan sti pula tes tha t, as

before, the first day is fully paid by the patient.

During

the subsequent two weeks, however, the patient must pay 8
percent of the daily charges.

Days 16

throu~h

60 have a 5

percent coinsu .r ance rate; thereafter, full coverage is
provided.

Intuitively, this proposal seems likely to ha ve a

profound cost-reducing effect, as the average stay of
Medicare patients is 11.5 days, well below the 60 day level
at which

co~e=rage

dramatically changes; also,

the bulk of
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hospital stays (97.6 percent) are less than 30 days
{1q.,p.S).

u sing the elasticities estimated in this paper,

the effects of this policy shift can be evaluated.
pres~nt

The

price to the consumer of a fifteen day stay is $304.

with the Feagan Froposal that price rises to $644.
percent increase in

price,~oupled

This 113

with an elasticity of

mean stay of -4.844 implies an impossible result-- a
~eduction

in quantity demanded of 547 percent.

There are,

however, several explanations for this insensible result.
Certainly, the price increase proposed

~y

the Beagan

Administration is based ufon Feldstein's estimated
elasticity,

~hich

is smaller than one in absolute value.

Also, it may be inappropriate to apply the estimated
elasticity of this paper to the Medicare proposal for two
reasons.

First, this elasticity may only hold for a certain

price range; the demand function may not have constant
elasticity.

Second, the elasticity is calculated for the

population in general, and the elderly may have an
elasticity much smaller in absolute value.

Indeed, if we

perceive the elderly to need care more because of their
deteriorating health, and ~f they tr~nslate that need into a
rigidity with respect to price changes, then their demand is
certainly less elastic than that of the general population.
If we assume, however, that the elasticity presented here is
applicable and accurate, then the .B eagan Administration's
suggested price increase is too drastic.

If, say, a 30
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percent decrease in quantity demanded is desired, a price
increase of E percent, a relatively small change,

is

recommended.
In connection with the Reagan-Feldstein proposal, it is
useful to examine the coefficient of PPEV, the proportion of
private benefits variable, found in this paper.

The

regression results presented in Chapter 4 show that the
proportion of ' pri va te hosJ:i tal insurance var iable is
negatively related to both the admissions rate and mean
length of stay.

That is, a state with a higher proportion

of private hospital insurance benefits paid has lower
admissions and shorter mean stay than a ' state with a lower
proportion Of private hospital insurance benefits paid,
cet~ri.§ ~f1:El!'§ •
elasti~ity

. This e.ffect is relatively small--the

of admission is -.053 and the elasticity of stay

is -.483--but it is significant in both cases.

This implies

that systematic differences exist between the privately
insured and the publicly insured regarding the level of
hospital care consumed.

Because age is already explicitly

taken into account, these differences can probably be
primarily attributed to

dif~erences

in opportunity cost of

time between the la1:ge majoI:ity of public insurance
beneficiaries--Medicare recipients--and private insurance
beneficiaries.

Because most Medicare recipients do not

work, the price of their time is much less than that of
private insurance beneficiaries, most of whom are employed.
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AS a result,

Medicar e recipients have a smaller disincentive

to sta y in the haspi tal than private insurance-holders, and,
as a result, t e nd to be admitted more frequently and stay
longer.

Also, it is possible that

differences in the

structure of insurance contracts of public and private
beneficiarie s create differences in incentives regarding
consumption.

Although great variety exists among private

insurance packages, most tend to offer low deductibles
(20,p.283).

As a result, many of the privately insured must

pay much of the cost of hospital care up to a speciIied
level, a fter which the insurance company provides full, or
at least partial, coverage.

By ccntrast, as previously

mentioned, Medicare, which compo ses a large proportion of
public insurance

~ayments,

is oriented towards comprehensive

co verage in the early stages' of hosp! taliza tion, and its
coverage can expire after a certain number of days.

Because

the vast majority of hos pital stays last thirty days or
less, Medicare recipients and private insurance-holder~ may
have differing incentives regarding their admission and
length of stay.

Because the private insurance-holder is

more likely to be paying for more of his stay than the
Medicare recipient, it is not surprising that statistical
testing reveals the Medicare recipient both to be admitted
more frequently and to stay longer.
differences in incentives,

To counteract these

partic~larly

the former, a change

in the !edicare benefit structure i s advocated.

The Reagan
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Admimistraticn proposal takes one approach to

th~s

problem;

another might involve a base ccinsurance ra te which rises
with each additional day of stay through the first thirty
days, plus an admissions monitoring system which raises the
level of the tase coinsurance rate and/or charges the
patient for two full

day~

instead of one if he has been

admitted "too often" within a certain past period of time.
The first proposal provides strong incentive to shorten
one's stay if possible; the second deters frequent
admissions.
More comFlex analysis of . the effect of coinsurance rate
c~anges

can be done using Feldstein's notion of welfare loss

(equation 1).

For the period studied in this paper,

1973-1977, the welfare gain from the reduced price and
quantity distortion of excess insurance can be estimated.
These welfare gains measure the dollar benefits from lower
hospital care use and lower hospital care prices When
hospital insurance is reduced.

To be specific, the

magnitude of welfare loss for 1973-1977, at the averaqe
coinsurance rate for that period, .356, is calculated.
Then, estimates of welfare loss for the same period, had
higher coinsurance rates been in effect, are made.

T.h e

difference between the latter value and the former value is
the welfare gai.n which would have resul ted from an increase
in the coinsurance rate.

In this analysis, the assumption

is made that the patient perceives no increase in quality of

6{)

treatment, and therefore the demand curve does not shift as
shown in Figure 2.

Ihis assumption is made because, first

of all, in a period of five years, it is unlikely that most
patients would have noticed a perceptible improvement in
quality.

Second, the

inc~ease

in price which Feldstein

asserts to be a signal of higher quality to patients, was
likely ascribed to inflaticn by patients, as the period
studied was one of high i~flation.
Equation

(~ ,

Referring again to

Feldstein notes that the parameter J, the

ratio of gross price with insurance to gross price without
.. b
insurance, can be written k, where k is the coinsurance
rate.

Two· different values are used for b:

l and.S.

The

latter value, .5, i s a more conservative estimate, as it
impli es a smaller increase in price when insurance is
~nstituted

than the value b=1.

Estimat~s

of the welfare

loss at various combinations of k and b as well the
potential

welfare gains from a higher coinsurance rate

during that l!ericd are listed in Table:L.

As can readily be

observed, increases in the coinsurance rate,

get~.£.i§

£ar,ibu§, are associated with lower levels of welfare loss.
If one assigns the largest realistic value, 1, to the price
change parameter, a gross welfare loss of $153 billion is
calculated.

Also, a potential gross gain of approximately

$80 billion was possible during 1973-1977, had a higher
coinsurance rate been in effect.

WELFARE LOSS

{$ BILLIONS),

1973-1971

Ccinsul:ance Rate

.5

.356

.5

.~;7

$114
$153

$68
$119

~34

POTEclTIAL VEllAE! GAIN

$79

INCBEASI~G COINSURANCE BATE
Coinsurance Rate
.356 to .5
.356 to .67
FBO~

b

$57
$3 5

$80
~B4

($ BILLIONS),

1973-

,'77
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Although the es timated loss of $153 billion
corresponding to k=.356, b=1 compared with total hospital
expenditures over the five year period of $237 billion is
probably exaggerated, reasons exist for this apparent
overestimation.

First, Feldstein I s model provides only an

approximation, a s its use requires the somewhat arbitrary
assignment of values to several paramaters.

Second, and

more fundamentally, the definition of welfare loss used here
is an exclusive cencept which doe s not take into account
se veral significant effects.

~wo

parti~ularly

important

ommissions from the 'we'lf ara loss model are measurement of
risk-spreading and measurement of externalities.

Although

Feldstein present s a function to measure the gains or losses
from different levels of

risk-spreading , he does not provide

explicit means for calculating all of the parameters of the
function.

As a result, the gains from risk-spreading which

accompany th e losses from price and quantity distortion were
unable to be measured.

Had measurement of risk-spreadinq

benefits been possible, mere realistic estimates could
been presented.

ha~e

A second siqnificant effect of insurance,

which Feldstein overlooks, is the externalities which are
generated by higher consumption of hospital care, which is a
result of higher levels of insurance.

Three different

externality effects may accompany higher consumption of
hospital care, two of which are positive, one of Which i s
negative.

One of the positive e xternalities is perceived to
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occur if health is considered as a public good.

While one's

own health is a private good, the h ealth of others is indeed
a public good.

Because someone else's hepatitis can become

our own, we have incentives to ensure that others do not
contract the disease.

Thus, the good "absence of hepatitis"

is a public good, as it fulfills the necessary qualities of
equality of con s umption for each member of society, zero
marginal cost, and ncn-excludability, i.e., one person's
consumption does not limit another's.

Because society

benefit s from the absence of hepatitis, a disease which can
be medically treated, medical insurance which prompts the
consumption of hepatitis treatment produces benefits which
offset, to seme extent, the welfare loss which accompanies
higher levels of insurance-holding.

A second

po~itive

e xternality of higher consumption of medical care benefits
employers.

Because of the

favorab~e

tax treatment Which

employer-provided health insurance receives, many of the
privately insured people in the United states are covered by
employment group plans.

Probably the employer's strongest

moti va tion in offer ing health insurance as part of employee
compensation, besides de s ire tc compete with firms which
offer similar plans, is the anticipated higher productivity
of a healthier workforce.

If employees are frequently i l l

they disrupt the production proce ss , and the firm's
productivity is rEduced •. If the employer feels that
provision of health insurance will enable ill employees to
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return to work seoner and to generally exhibit better
health, then it is in hi s best interest to provide

it~

In

this s am e s ituation, how e ver, the potential exists for
negati VE externalities.

If increased provision of insurance

encourages e IIlFloyees to see k trea tllen t more frequently th an
they need it, they viII tend to miss work more frequently
than before.

Thus, the employer's good intentions may be

foiled if emFloyees respond differently than he anticipates.
Because the net effect of these three externalitie s and
risk-spreading i s

prot~bly

positive, estimates made using

Feldstein's model of welfare loss should be considered as
maximum values • . Finally, further research done in this area
should attempt to quantitatively incorporate

ill

welfare

effect s in calculations of the loss which accompanies the
possession of excess health insurance.
The implications discussed above estimate the impact of
changes in the coinsurance rate and of a ' chanqe in Medicare
provisions.

Another pos sible solution to the problem of

excessive, rising health expenditures is a fundamental
change in the nature of private insurance c ontracts.

Huch

bewilderment and, paradoxically, many suggestions for change
have accompanied the tremendous rise of prices and
expenditures in the American hospital system.

Certainly the

problem is complex; the intertwining of buyer,

seller~

and

insurer has created a nearly unimaginable distortion of
ince~tives.

Many consumers of hospital care pay so little
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of the bill that their incentives to reduce consumption ara
small; hospitals and physicians attempt to maximize income,
so they have no incentive to lower costs; and insurers
sim~ly

a djust premiums upward to cover their ever-burgeoning

expenses.

Thus, the individual consumer

~r

his employer, .

ina sense)

and taxpayer tear the escalating costs of public
U 1\ ~OC"-~....
and priv~te hospital in s urance. ~
j the

~- ~~'t.~~

individual

-

e xpenditures.

-

incentive to reduce hospital

The major problem with the present system is

that individual costs and ben e fit s are divorced from one
another.

To influence individual incentives regarding th e

consumption of hospital c are,
placed in direct relation.

cost~

and benefits must be

One method for doing this is

what Viscusi (24) refers to as "merit

ratinq"~

Merit rating

signifies that an individual' s premium be adjusted up or
down based upon the extent of his claims in the preceding
period.

In

Vis~usi's

model, if no claims are made, the

.premium decreases; if claims are made, the premium increases
relative to the amount of claims made by the individual.
Viscusi develops a comparative statics model which uses the
above payment procedure.

His results strongly confirm th e

efficacy of merit rating as a cost reduction device.

Using

a tvo-person, two-state model (claim,no claim) he shows that
a lower premium fcllowing no claim artd a higher premium
following a claim each induce less insurance-holding and
mor&self-protection by both the claimant and the

65
non-claimant.

Viscusi's results can analogously be applied

to the present eXFerience-rating model which dominates the
private health insurance market.

To reiterate,

experience-rating means that the premium which an individual
pays is based on the risk associated with the demographic
{age,sex,rac€,income) group to which the individual
belongs"

and increases in premiums are solely based on the

expenses of that group, and not on increases in individual
claims.

To test viscusi's model, assume that one firm in

the private health insurance market, Moral Hazard Insurance,
Inc. has two clients, Mr.

Risk and

premium for each is p,dollars.

~r.

Distortion.

The

During period one, Mr. Risk

is hospitali2ed at a cost to Moral Hazard, Inc. of W
dollars, while Mr. Distortion is not hospitalized.

I£ we

assume that Moral Hazard, Inc. has no administrative costs,
then premiums must rise by W dollars to cover Mr. Eiskts
expense.

Under the conventional practices of private

insurers, Mr.

Ris~'s

of his group,

~r.

expense is shared with the other member

Distortion.

As . a result, the new premium

for each is Flo ;:p. + • 5Vi , as 11r. Risk's expenditure is spread
equally among the members of his

gro~p.

Aceording to

viscusi's model, ~Mt. ij,3k ~ ~r. Distortion will
purchase more insurance and engage in less self-protection
~

in period tWO' Awith the former behavior causing more
freguent and more costly hospitalizations and the latter
behavior creating a higher probability of illness and thus
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of ho s pitalization .
in s uranCE are

As

d

per~etuated

result, the distortive effects of
and increased, giving a

low-consumption person Like Mr. Distortion an incentive to
se e k an insurance plan in which premiums paid are directly
related to individual benefits received.
Not only do incentives exist for low-consumption private
insurance holders to see k a merit-rating plan, but they also
exist for insurance companies.
lO)ler

their~resEnt

Companie s could conceivably

prami ums fer low-consumption clients to

a pric e still abcve expected cost, while simultaneously
raising the premium for high-con s umption clients to a price
still below Expected co s t so that they could still break
even.

Assuming that all insurance-holders were free to

break thEir contracts immediately without penalty, and that
all

in s uranc~

comFanies could obtain e vidence of the amount

of each persen' s Expenditures in the previous period, all
low-consumption

FE~ple

would purchase policies with the

firms using merit-rating and all high-consumption people
would flEe to firms without merit-rating, which would offer
a lower price.

,fter this massive adjustment, competition

would adjust the premiums of all compani es such that the y
were proportional to expected cost, i.e., a merit-rating
system.

To allow .f o£ some risk-spreading, each person would

have to pay a certain amount (regardless of expected
consumption)

which would be the same for all those covered

by one plan.

Although this risk-spreading portion of the
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premium would be the same for each person in a given plan in
a given year, the merit-rating portion of the premium would
monitor con s umption, as individuals would have to pay k
percent of their previou s year' s expenditures.

Thus the new

premium formula is:

(15)

Pi

=R

.. kX:(t-1)

where P;=the ith person' s premium in time t
B=the equal risk-spreading portion of everyone's premium
k=coDstant fraction of benefits paid in time
Xi{t-l) =benefi ts paid on behalf of person i

in time (t-l)

Thus, B still allows ri s k-spreading to occur, but kXi(tensures that people- will consider the necessity
magnitude of their expenditure s .
~hy

~-1}

n

~nd

It is difficult to know

merit-rating Flans have not been offered by priva te

health insurers; perhaps this is a fitting
research.

to~ic

for future
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(

The price which the ccnsumer pays influences his demand
for hospital use, with price changes exerting a greater
influence on length of stay than on admissions rate by a
factor of eight.

The elasticity of stay calculated in this

paper is much higher than previous estimates and is elastic,
casting some doubt on the estimate presented, although
reasons can be advan6ed for expecting the elasticity of mean
stay to exceed the

elastic~ty

of admissions.

In attempting

to apply this elasticity to a recent government proposal it
is clear that a markedly different elasticity is used to
make the government's calculation of demand effects.

The

estimated welfare gains from higher coinsurance rates are
also calculated.

As a result it is shown that an increase

in the coinsurance rate from .356, the actual value, to

.67

would have produced a gross welfare gain of approximately
$80 billion during the period 1973-1977.
be

~iewed

These figures must

with gualification, however, as the definition of

welfare loss used does not take risk-spreading and
externality benet its into acco un t.
Finally, suggestions are made concerning the nature of
both public and pri vate insurance contracts.

A given amOUD t

of Medicare has a larger effect on demand than an equal
amount of private insurance.

As a result a new type of
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Medicare contract i s proposed--one in which incentives to
reduce admissions and shorten length of s tay are provided.
wi th respect to private insurance, the institution of a
s ystem which associates individual insurance benefits and
premiums--merit-rating-- is proposed as the best way to
control hospital costs:

an appeal to individual incentives.
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